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CATEGORY MANAGEMENT: THE
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Bradley J. Lorden*
Introduction
local grocer, have you ever
hen walking
wondered
whythrough
productsyour
are placed where they are on the
shelves? For example, why are certain products placed at eyelevel, while others are below on the bottom shelf? Why are some
products placed next to others while some are placed on the endcaps of the aisles? Have you ever wondered how your grocer
decides to carry the specific brands they do or how they decide to
run a certain promotion when they do?
These are all questions that are answered through the
retail management practice of category management. Category
management analyzes consumer purchase information to make
decisions about which brands and products a retailer should
carry, where on the shelves these products should be placed, at
what prices they should be offered, and when the products should
be part of a promotion.' This practice evolved in the early 1990s
as an improvement on the traditional approach, brand
management.2 As opposed to brand management, a retailer using
category management makes its decisions based on the category

W

*J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola University of Chicago School
of Law; B.A., Marketing, Michigan State University.
'See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER
MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY (2001) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.

pdf.
2 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Category Management Antitrust
Handbook 3 (2010) [hereinafter ABA Handbook]; see also Robert L. Steiner,
Category Management - A Pervasive, New Vertical/Horizontal Format, 15

ANTITRUST 77, 77 (2001).
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as a whole, rather than by task or by brand. Since it is more
efficient for suppliers to handle category management duties,
most retailers now turn this responsibility over to a "category
captain," a leading supplier in the particular category.' This
practice of a supplier making decisions or giving advice to a
retailer about not only its own prices and products but also those
of a competitor leads to inherent antitrust concerns.s
This note begins by discussing the background of category
management, providing the historical and practical reasons for
why the practice emerged, and noting category management
practices that could potentially lead to antitrust concerns in Part
I. Next, Part II provides antitrust analysis from both the U.S. and
European perspectives. Part III then provides suggested changes
to U.S. antitrust law as applied to category management. Finally,
Part IV discusses why favorable reform is necessary because
category management ultimately benefits the consumer.
I. Background
Category management is a retail management practice
that involves in-depth consumer analysis which enables retailers
to tailor their pricing and product selection to best meet consumer
preferences.6 This consumer analysis is concentrated at the
product-category level,' such as deodorant, cereal, or, more
generally, breakfast foods. These product categories are then
managed like their own small business (or profit center), and
decisions are made based on the category as a whole, rather than
on single brands.8 This practice differs from brand management
-

the traditional form of retail marketing -

because decisions

are made across multiple competing brands, taking into account
the interactions among them.'
Category management enables retailers to use their limited
FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
4ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 49-50.
Carameli, Jr., The Anti-Competitive Effects and Antitrust
6 Leo S.
Implications of Category Management and Category Captains of Consumer
Products, 79 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2004); see also ABA Handbook,
supra note 2, at 3.
7 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 47; ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 1314.
8 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 13-14; see also Thomas W. Gruen, The
Evolution of Category Management, 2 ECR J. 17 (2002).
1 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 13-14.
3
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shelf space in the most efficient and profitable manner.10 With
this category-focused technique, retailers are able to offer the best
product assortment, organized in the most effective way on the
shelves, and at the prices consumers are most willing to pay." In
the end, consumers win because they get the prices and products
they are most interested in purchasing, and retailers increase
customer satisfaction and loyalty.12
Category management emerged as a retail management
practice in the supermarket industry in the mid-1990s. 3 Since
then, it has swept across the grocery industry in the United
States, Europe, and across the globe.14 The practice has also
expanded to convenience stores, pharmacies, and other mass
outlet chains." This trend is partially due to the vertical
integration sparked by Wal-Mart and its suppliers in the mid1980s.' 6 Wal-Mart's vertical partnerships mainly focused on
logistical efficiencies; however, the same idea engendered the
growth of the category management practice."
At a time when the supermarket industry was losing
market share to supercenters and discount stores, there was the
incentive for retailers to use their upstream suppliers in a more
efficient manner." This led supermarkets to turn over their
category management duties to their suppliers and designate a
supplier or two to act as a "category captain." 9 A category
captain is generally a leading manufacturer in the industry that
takes responsibility for managing a product category at a
designated retailer.2 0 The category captain's duties can vary
based on the extent of the relationship, but, typically, a captain
provides information and advice based on its in-depth knowledge
10 See Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting
Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON. 421 (2007); see also Antitrust and Category
Captains, ROUNDTABLE DIscussIoN (Nat'1 Press Club, Washington, D.C.),
June 23, 2003, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/270.pdf

[hereinafter ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION].
"

at 13.
12
13

Carameli, supra note 6, at 1314; see also ABA Handbook, supra note 2,
Carameli, supra note 6, at 1314.
Steiner, supra note 2, at 77-78; see also ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at

3.
Steiner, supra note 2, at 77.
Id.
Id.
17 Id.
1

15
16

11Id. at 77-78.
19Id.
20

at 77.
Id.; see also ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 3.
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about consumer preferences in a particular product category.2 1
However, sometimes the captain may be given much more
responsibility and could even make ultimate decisions about
which brands and products its retailer should sell.22
Regardless of the form of the relationship, the partnership
makes practical and economical sense for several reasons. First,
the retailer lacks both the incentive and the necessary resources to
conduct this research." A retailer's main goal is to attract
customers away from its competitors and to increase the number
of purchases its customers will make.24 A retailer is generally not
concerned whether its customers purchase one product over
another.25 Suppliers, on the other hand, are very interested in
researching why a customer purchases its competitors' products
over its own, so the supplier, rather than the retailer, is more
likely to conduct this analysis.26 In the end, all parties win; the
consumer gets the products and prices it is looking for, the
retailer gets more business due to more effective product
offerings, and the supplier strengthens the relationship with its
retailers.
Furthermore, the supplier has the expertise and the
knowledge to most effectively manage a product category. With
the increased use of scanner data, a supplier can use its multitude
of consumer information to determine which factors specifically
drive a consumer's purchase (e.g., prices, promotions, and
product placement).27 Suppliers also have the necessary personnel
to implement category management suggestions, such as
preparing in-store displays, shelf reorganization, and pricing
changes.2 8
Supermarkets and grocery chains typically spend very
minimal amounts on marketing at the store level, so it is
beneficial to rely on suppliers for this service.29 In an industry

21

Carameli, supra note 6, at 1314.

2

FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.

3

24
21

26

ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 10.

Id.

Id. at 19.

Id.

2
Mary W. Sullivan, Slotting Allowances and the Market for New
Products, 40 J. LAW & EcON. 461, 475 (199.7).
28 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 10.
" Brandon Copple, Shelf Determination: Under Betsy Holden, Kraft
Foods is Winning the War of the Aisles, FORBEs, Apr. 15, 2002, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0415/130.html.
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where net profit after taxes is only about 1-2%,o a supermarket
will do whatever it takes to save money. Because successful
category management is essentially unattainable without a
category captain, securing these services has become a regular
practice among retailers."
II. Antitrust Analysis

Antitrust laws are intended to promote competition, so
obvious antitrust concerns arise when a single supplier is given
the power to influence retailer decisions regarding not only the
supplier's own products, but its competitors' products, too. This
section analyzes possible anti-competitive situations and provides
suggested approaches for compliance with United States antitrust
law and foreign competition law.
A. United States Antitrust Analysis
In 2001, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a
report on marketing practices in the grocery industry ("FTC
Report") that specifically addressed the category captain
relationship.3 2 In the FTC Report, the FTC set forth four specific
situations that may create anti-competitive issues. 3 For example,
"[t]he category captain might: (1) learn confidential information
about rivals' plans; (2) hinder the expansion of rivals; (3) promote
collusion among retailers; or (4) facilitate collusion among
manufacturers." 34 The ABA Section on Antitrust Law has also
recognized a fifth category, (5) tortious conduct. 5 These five
situations can be grouped into two major themes: the exclusion of
rival suppliers from the market, and the collusion among
suppliers or retailers by means of the category captain
relationship. 36 The first two situations above, along with tortious
conduct, deal with the "exclusion" theme, and the third and
fourth situations fall within the "collusion" theme.

1o See FOOD MKTG. INST., Supermarket Facts: Grocery Store Chains Net
Profit - Percent of Sales (Dec. 2008), available at http://fmi.org/docs/facts-figs/
Net%20profit%2Opercent%2 Oof%2Osales2008.pdf.
3'

32

ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 3.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 1.

" Id. at 50.
34 Id.
3s

ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 42-46.
generally ABA Handbook, supra note 2.

6 See
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1. Access to Competitors' Information
The first instance of potential exclusionary behavior
occurs when category captains are given access to competitors'
information."7 As the FTC points out, this information can be
used to "thwart the growth of [competitors] or lessen their
incentive to produce innovative plans, to the ultimate detriment
of consumers." 8 A supplier could use this information to beat its
competitors to the market with new products or to run a
concurrent and competing promotion with its competitors.39
The FTC recommends the use of internal firewalls to
ensure
that sensitive competitor
information is not
inappropriately distributed. 4 0 A supplier should separate
employees that make category suggestions from those that receive
information about competitors' plans.4 1 This helps ensure that
unbiased decisions are being made and may help a supplier
disprove allegations regarding the misuse of competitor
information. Also, as a general rule, any decision made by a
category captain should always have a legitimate business reason
based on objective evidence of what is best for the category as a
whole.4 2 While this alone will not protect against antitrust
violations, it will help a defendant's case.
Although there is not a specific case on point, the Supreme
Court seems to support the free flow of information between
suppliers and retailers. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. SprayRite Services Corp., the Court stated, "distributors are an
important source of information for manufacturers." 43 In United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 44 the Court noted in another context
that sharing prices between a retailer and supplier encourages
competition among suppliers, ultimately leading to reduced prices

* FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 50-5 1.
3 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 50.
3 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 46-47; see also FTC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 50.
, 40 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 36; see also FTC REPORT, supra note
1, at 51.
41 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at
51.
42 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
605 (1985) (stating "[i]f a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some
basis other than efficiency,', it is fair to characterize its behavior as
predatory.").
43 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
44 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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for the consumer.4 5
2. The Restriction of Rivals' Expansion
The second area of exclusionary concern is the category
captain's power to control a retailer's marketing decisions that
might ultimately hinder rivals' expansion.4 6 A captain can
exclude its rivals through one of two ways: (a) by making
recommendations "about product placement and promotions
[that] could hinder the entry or expansion of other manufacturers,
leading to less variety and possibly higher prices," 47 or (b) through
exclusive dealing agreements between a retailer and supplier. 48
a. Recommendations Made by Category Captains
A category captain may facilitate exclusion if the captain's
recommendations result in the placement of the captain's
products and the removal of competitors' products. 49 A
recommendation, alone, is not sufficient to reach an exclusive
dealing claim,50 and courts are less likely to find so when the
ultimate decision rests with the retailer.51 A court's decision will
mainly focus on whether the recommendation resulted in actual
exclusivity.52 The issuance of elimination recommendations is a
purpose of category captains when the recommendations are
supported with "accurate, localized data, and where they do not
confer exclusivity on the retailer's shelves... "513
According to former FTC Commissioner Thomas B.
Leary, "[tihe best strategy for a captain may be to recommend a
plan that will preserve its already strong market position rather
than blatantly enhance it."5 4 The former Commissioner sees a
45

Id. at 456-57.

46

FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51-52.

47
48

Id. at 51.

49

Id. at 48.

ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 37-42.

s See Stearns v. Genrad, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1309, 1313-314 (M.D.N.C.
1983), affd, 752 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1984).
5I NicSand, Inc v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 451-53 (6th Cir. 2007).
52 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 50.
13

Id.

" Thomas B. Leary, A Second Look at Category Management at 6 (June
23, 2003). This paper is based on oral remarks delivered on June 23, 2003 at
the American Antitrust Institute's Roundtable Discussion on Antitrust and
Category Captains; in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Leary] available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/040519categorymgmt.pdf.
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distinct difference between a category captain advising on its own
brands versus advising on pricing and promotions for a
competitor's brand.5 s Leary points out that while there is no case
specifically stating that a captain advising on a competitor's
prices is per se illegal, the practice is "inherently suspect."56
b. Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing occurs when a retailer promises to deal
exclusively with a supplier and thus agrees not to purchase from
other suppliers.5" Exclusive dealing can also arise if a supplier's
actions have the effect of creating an "exclusive" arrangement
between the retailer and supplier.5 For example, exclusive
dealing can occur when a captain "rais[es its] rivals' distribution
costs by eliminating their access to downstream markets."59
Retailers typically choose a captain that has the greatest or
second-greatest sales in the category. 0 A captain with this
amount of market power can achieve an exclusionary effect if it is
given the power to decide the product offering, pricing, and
placement at its retailers' stores. 6 1 However, as an FTC panelist
points out, the "exclusion of rivals by a category captain is
unlikely as a practical matter: such tactics are not in the best
interest of the retailer, and if a category captain behaves in that
manner, it will have progressively less influence as an advisor."62
In analyzing whether there is an illegal exclusive dealing
arrangement, a court considers several factors: the actual
agreement between the parties, the impact the arrangement has
on the market,6 4 the market power of the category captain,6 5 and
. s Paul B. Hewitt & Mary Anne Mason, Category Management: An
Interview with FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary at 3, NEWSLETTER,
(Sherman Act Section 2 Comm.), Spring 2005, at 6-7 [hereinafter FTC
Interview],
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/050328aba
interview.pdf.
s6 Id. at 4.
' A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements And Other
Exclusionary Conduct - Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
375, 375 (2006).
58 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 37.
s9 Id.
60 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
6' ABA Handbook, supra note 2,
at 37.
62 FTC REPORT, supra note 1,
at 52.
6' ABA Handbook, supra note 2,
at 38.
64 Id.
65 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. 199 F. Supp. 2d 362,
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foreclosure of competitors or injury to competition. 6 As a defense,
the defendant may offer evidence of the efficiencies gained by its
conduct.6 ' The court will most likely balance these factors and
determine whether there is a less restrictive alternative."
In general, retailers should retain ultimate discretion in
making category decisions; 69 placing that amount of power in a
supplier's hands is illogical for both business and antitrust
reasons.70 Instead -of granting decision-making powers to a
captain, a retailer should only take recommendations and should
not solely rely on a captain's category proposal. Another
approach used by some retailers is to arrange for second opinions
from another supplier or engage a "third-party advisor" with no
vested interest in the category." These conservative approaches
can help a retailer ensure it does not inadvertently implement
anti-competitive category decisions.
3. Collusion Among Retailers
A situation that can cause collusion problems is when a
single supplier acts as a captain for multiple competing retailers.72
This arrangement can be conducive to collusion for two reasons:
(a) the category captain can facilitate information sharing and
agreement between competing retailers, known as the "hub-andspoke" theory," or (b) the category captain may use its central,
authoritative role to "set" prices at competing retailers.74

394 (M.D.N.C. 2002), affd, 67 F. App'x 810, 812 (4th Cir. 2003), the district
court held that 51.3% market share was insufficient to support an exclusive
dealing claim. The court of appeals affirmed and based its decision on the lack
of foreclosed competition, not on Philip Morris' lack of market power.
66 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 38; see also, El Aguila 131 F. App'x
450 at *3. El Aguila provides a good example of a court considering these
factors. For example, the court took notice of the many other competitors
present in the stores, the number of new competitors to the market, and the
fact that the plaintiff's products were in the stores where the defendant had
paid a slotting fee.
6' ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 38.
68
69
70

1

Id.

FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54; ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 36.
Leary, supra note 54, at 2.
Steiner, supra note 2, at 7 7-78.

72 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 33.
"3Id. at 33-34; FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53; FTC Interview, supra

note 55, at 6-7.
74 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 33.
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a. The "Hub-and-Spoke" Theory
In this first scenario, competing retailers can use
information from the category captain to coordinate pricing,
promotional events, or product offerings." To establish a claim
under this theory, all of the participants must know of the
project's unlawful nature and knowingly participate in it.16 As
the FTC Report points out, category management inherently
requires the sharing of sensitive information between retailers
and suppliers;" however, there are certain safeguards that both
retailers and suppliers can use to ensure that confidential
information is used properly.
Retailers can best protect themselves by only appointing
category captains that are not currently serving as a captain for
direct competitors of the retailer." Also, according to the FTC
Report, abuse of the category captain position can result from the
inexperience of firms in using category management, or from poor
training of category managers.79 Before implementation, retailers
should be knowledgeable about the practice of category
management and should properly train employees to ensure
information is properly used.
Suppliers can best protect themselves by designating
separate teams of employees to the different retailers.s0 This
approach, coupled with strict confidentiality rules governing
information exchange among employees, would help a supplier
mitigate its potential antitrust liability.8 1 The FTC suggests that
employees who receive information about competitors should not
be involved in the management of the firm's own brands and that
these employees not communicate the information to those in
charge of the brands.8 2

7

Id.
See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2000); see
also Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 459 F.2d 138, 14647 (6th Cir. 1972).
" FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 50.
7 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 34.
7 FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 54, n. 178 ("You can't just say, One day
you're a buyer, next day you're a category manager, because that's what
happens.").
80
Id. at 51.
" Id. at 54.
8
Id. at 51.
76
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b. The "Common Price Setter" Theory
The other situation involving a single supplier acting as
captain for multiple retailers is what is known as the "common
price setter" theory. 3 This is similar to the hub-and-spoke theory
but involves "setting" prices at competing retailers.8 4 This can
unknowingly happen to a retailer if a captain makes identical
price recommendations to several retailers, and each retailer
adheres strictly to the captain's recommendation. Regardless of
whether it was intentional or not, courts have held that this
practice is a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6
To repudiate any "price setter" allegations, retailers should
retain ultimate price setting authority and should refrain from
adopting a captain's recommendations in their entirety." More
importantly, a retailer should refrain from using a captain that is
already serving in that capacity for competitors." This will
protect retailers against unknowingly "setting prices." Again,
suppliers should use different teams of employees combined with
internal safeguards so that competitor pricing information is not
shared internally."
All of the recommended measures identified above should
be memorialized in a written agreement between a retailer and its
category captain. Throughout implementation, these measures
should also be well documented in order to prove that
appropriate steps were taken to prevent collusive practices.
4. Collusion Among Manufacturers
Another potentially problematic scenario is when multiple
suppliers act as co-captains for a single retailer. In this situation,
the co-captains can collude and decide that only their products
will be sold at the designated retail chain.90 The sharing of
information between competitors is another concern in this
situation." Such practice could indirectly lead to collusion
8
84

See ABA Handbook, supra note 2.

Id. at 52.

8Id.

at 53.

Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1969); Va.
Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958).
8 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 34-35.
88 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
8 Id. at 51; ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 34-35.
90 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 33.
6

91Id.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

552

[Vol. 23:4

because the competitor could tailor their pricing and product
offerings based on the information obtained from the rival
supplier.92
From a supplier standpoint, both of these antitrust issues
can be avoided by simply being ethical and using common sense.
Knowingly colluding would obviously be an issue, but a supplier
should also be cognizant of the use of competitors' information.
Also, as discussed above, the FTC suggests creating internal
firewalls and having a legitimate business reason for a captain's
action. 3
From a retailer's perspective, establishing boundaries with
category captains through use of a written agreement is an
effective method of ensuring compliance. 94 For example, the
retailer should always retain ultimate authority in the decisionmaking process.95 The agreement should also contain a
confidentiality provision to ensure that information is not illegally
shared between rival suppliers."
5. Tortious Conduct
Conwood, a Sixth Circuit case, involved the United States
Tobacco Co. ("USTC") and its role as category captain in the
nearly $1.7 billion moist snuff market. USTC was the leading
manufacturer in this industry and held about a 77% market share
while the plaintiff in the case, Conwood, held about a 13% share
of the market." Conwood alleged - and provided evidence and
witness testimony - that USTC used its category captain position
to exclude competition by:
(1) remov[ing] racks from stores without the permission
of store management and discarded and/or destroyed
these racks . . . ; (2) trained their "operatives to take

.

advantage of inattentive store clerks ... ; (3) misused its
position as category manager by providing misleading
information to retailers in an effort to dupe retailers into
believing ... that USTC products were better selling so
92

Id.

9 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
9 ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 36.
9
96

9

See Id.; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 36.
Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir.

2002).
98 Id.

2011]

Category Management

553

that retailers would carry USTC products and
discontinue carrying Conwood products; and (4) entered
into exclusive agreements with retailers in an effort to
exclude rivals' products."
Even though the record also included evidence that there were no
anti-competitive effects,'o the district court upheld the jury
verdict in favor of Conwood, and awarded $350 million in
damages, which USTC appealed.'
The Sixth Circuit rejected USTC's three arguments: (1)
that the rack removal/destruction were only instances of "isolated
sporadic torts" rather than widespread antitrust violation; (2) that
Conwood did not establish a causal link between USTC's
practices and antitrust injury; and (3) that Conwood failed to
show sufficient foreclosure from the market as was required
under recent exclusive dealing cases under Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.102 The Sixth Circuit rejected this last argument
because Conwood's claims involved product destruction and the
abuse of the category captain relationship rather than simple
exclusive dealing.'0
Although Conwood is a seminal case in the area of
category management, applying it has proven difficult. This is
because of the hybrid nature of USTC's conduct, which involved
both tortious conduct and legitimate competitive activity.10 4 Also,
despite the evidence that there were no anti-competitive effects,
the court nonetheless found that USTC's conduct was anticompetitive. 0 The unique elements of this case make applying
the decision difficult in other category management situations
and leave questions unanswered for practitioners in this field.
For example, when does business defamation and tortious
at 783.
See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competitionfor Distribution,
23 YALE J. ON REG. 169, 193-94 (2006) ("(1) Conwood's market share, and~the
market shares of several competitors, increased during the relevant time
period; (2) the market experienced a 45% increase in output; (3) successful
entry by new brands; and (4) United States Tobacco enjoyed a modest 10%
success rate at obtaining exclusive product display racks.") [hereinafter Wright,
Antitrust Law].
"Id.
100

101 Conwood, 290

F.3d at 773.

D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Category Management:
Conwood v. United States Tobacco Co., 17 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 311, 327
(2009) [hereinafter Wright, Antitrust Analysis].
103 Id.
104Id.
105 See Wright, Antitrust Law, supra note 100, at 169.
102Joshua
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conduct rise to the level of antitrust liability rather than simply
tort liability? 0 6 How widespread does the tortious conduct need
to be?o' Can a single act be enough, or does there need to be a
pattern of conduct? 08 These questions appear to be unresolved,
and the Conwood court did not provide guidance on many of
these issues.
B. Foreign Competition Law Considerations
This section focuses on international standards for
determining whether category captain practices are considered
anti-competitive. Outside of the United States, the practice is
most prevalent in Europe; therefore, the majority of this analysis
is based on European law. The analysis is broken down into three
sections: (1) guidelines promulgated by the European
Commission and the French Competition Authority; (2) the draft
settlement agreement of 2004 between Coca-Cola and the
European Commission; and (3) foreign conduct that affects U.S.
commerce.
1. Guidelines
The main source of European law on category
management stems from the European Commission's Verticals
Block Exemption Regulation ("VBER") and from the
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ("the
accompanying
Guidelines"). 109 The European Commission ("EC") enacted the
Guidelines on July 28, 2009, and they will likely remain in force
until 2020.110 The Guidelines acknowledge that, if practiced
legally, category management leads to higher customer
satisfaction and greater economic benefits."' The Guidelines set
forth specific recommendations for how firms operating in the
European Union can practice category management in

'o' ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 46.
107 Id.
108Id.
109 See generally, Commission Notice for Guidelines on Vertical Restraint,
SEC (2010) 411 [hereinafter EC Guidelines], available at http://ec.
europa.eulcompetition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines vertical en.pdf.
no Andrbs Font Galarza et al., European Union: EC Publishes Draft
Antitrust Rules Governing DistributionAgreements, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING
(July 30, 2009).
..EC Guidelines,supra note 109, at 213.
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accordance with the VBER.112
First, the VBER exempts from its rules category
management relationships involving retailers and suppliers that
both have market shares less than 30%." For firms with market
shares above this threshold, the EC provides a list of factors it
considers in its anti-competitive analysis.' 1 4 The main factor in
considering the possible anti-competitive effect is the "market
position of the supplier" and the foreclosure effect the supplier's
market share has on competing firms."'s
The duration of the category captain relationship is
another factor considered."' The Guidelines state that, in general,
agreements shorter than one year entered into by non-dominant
companies are in general not considered to be anti-competitive."'
Agreements between one and five years entered into by nondominant companies are usually analyzed with a balancing test
involving the pro- and anti-competitive effects."' Agreements
lasting longer than five years are analyzed under the assumption
that the purported efficiencies outweigh their foreclosure effect."'
The Guidelines note that category management agreements
entered into by dominant companies, regardless of their length,
are more likely to result in anti-competitive foreclosure. 2 0
The analysis also involves the market position of a
supplier's competitors."' The Guidelines state that, as long as the
competitors are sufficiently numerous, no strong, appreciable,
anti-competitive effects can be expected.122 In analyzing the
strength of competitors, the Guidelines set specific standards
regarding market share.'2 3 For example, where the market share
of the largest supplier is below 30% and the market share of the
five largest suppliers is below 50%, the Guidelines say there is
M2Id.
113
114

132-40, 210-12.

Id. 1209.
See EC Guidelines, supra note 109, at
Id. 132 (citation omitted).

1s
"6 Id.

132-40.

133.

133; See Comm'n Recommendation
EC Guidelines, supra note 109,
(EC) No. 361/2003 of 6 May 2003, 2003 O.J. L 124/36, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:124:0036:0041:en:PD
F.
1"

s18
Id.
"1 Id.
120

Id.

121 Id.
122
123

134.

Id.
Id. 135.
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unlikely to be a single or cumulative anti-competitive effect. 124 In
these situations, "[i]f a potential entrant cannot penetrate the
market profitably, this is likely to be due to factors other than [the
category captain relationship]."l 25
The Guidelines also consider the barriers to entry. When
there are minimal barriers, market foreclosure is unlikely to be a
problem.126 The Guidelines further note that the relationship is
unlikely to produce anti-competitive results when there is
significant "countervailing power" present, i.e., the buyer's power

is significant.127
In making its determination, the EC considers each of the
factors listed above. It also sets forth a general rule in retail
settings: if a non-dominant supplier ties up 30% or more of the
relevant market, it is likely to be considered anti-competitive.'2 8
For a dominant supplier, even a modest amount tied up in an
exclusive dealing agreement is likely. to be considered anticompetitive. 129
Apart from 'the Guidelines, the first European entity to
specifically address category management is the French
30
In its opinion issued on
Competition Authority ("FCA").o
December 7, 2010, the FCA recognized that category
management could lead to exclusion of competing suppliers as
well as collusion between retailers.' 3 However, the FCA's
opinion was not as specific as the EC guidelines at addressing
what specifically constitutes anti-competitive behavior.
124

Id.

125

Id.
Id. 1136.
Id. 137.
Id. 140.

126

127
128
129

Id.

13 See Republique Fran Autorite de la Concurrence [French Competition
Authority], Avis no 10-A-25 du 7 d6cembre 2010 [Opinion No. 10-A-25 of
December 7, 2010] [hereinafter FCA Opinion], available at http://
www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/10a25.pdf.
131 See id.; see also The French Competition Authority Issues Two
Opinions on the Mass Retail Food Distribution Section, CMTY. WEEK (SJ
2010, available at
10,
Dec.
Eng.),
London,
LLP,
Berwin
http://www.sjberwin.com/ebf/eu-competition/communityweek/2010_Decemb
er_10/download.pdf [hereinafter SJ Berwin LLP]; see also Category
Management Agreements: A New Field Means of Concerted Practices?,PARIS
COMPETITION NEWSLETTER (Norton Rose LLP, Paris, Fr.), Jan., 2011,
available at http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2011/pub
33439.aspx?lang=en-gb&page=all#publication-page_110104105321
[hereinafter Norton Rose LLP].
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First, the FCA focused primarily on the "tripartite
concerted practice," also known as the "hub-and-spoke" theory
discussed above.13 2 Also, the FCA only makes two general
recommendations: first, that the appointment of a category
captain be made public, such as through a tender for
applications; and second, the FCA recommends that category
management agreements clearly set forth each party's specific
responsibilities."' The FCA's somewhat vague recommendations
are partially due to the nature of the category-captain
relationships. existing in France.13 4 In its opinion, the FCA notes
that French retailers typically reserve ultimate authority on
marketing policies, while the captains only provide non-binding
recommendations."' Since this already creates a lower risk of
anti-competitive behavior, the FCA most likely believed that
strict guidelines were not as necessary as in other countries.
2. Case Law
One of the largest European cases in recent history
involving the abuse of a supplier's dominant market position is
the draft settlement agreement entered on October 19, 2004
between Coca-Cola ("Coke") and the European Commission."'
While this settlement agreement was regarding Coke's abuse of
its dominant market position, its general principles can be used to
analyze a category management relationship as well."' The
agreement applies to all EU states where Coke's market share is
over 40% or where Coke's sales are more than twice that of its
nearest competitor.138
The draft .settlement agreement sets some specific
requirements by which Coke must abide by in EU member states
and these factors are instructive as to what practices the EC may
132

Norton Rose LLP, supra note 131.

13

SJ Berwin LLP, supra note 131.

FCA Opinion, supra note 130, at 5.
Id.
136 See
generally Undertaking Case Comp/39.116/B-2 - Coca-Cola
[hereinafter Undertaking], available at http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/
antitrust/cases/decdocs/39116/39116_5_6.pdf; see also Heba M. Hamouda,
Agreement With Coca-Cola Ends The European Union's Five Year Inquiry
Into A Potential Abuse Of A Dominant Position (2004), available at
http://www.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/pdfs/hamoudacoca
cola.pdf.
13' Hamouda supra note 136, at 1.
138 Undertaking, supra note 136 at
2.
134

1s
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consider anti-competitive. The main requirement the EC set forth
was that Coke had to put an end to all exclusivity
arrangements.1 3 This empowered all Coke retail customers to
freely buy and sell carbonated soft drinks from the suppliers of
their choice.140 Coke was also banned from offering "target
rebates" to customers that purchased the same amount or an
increased amount as their previous purchase quantity.141 Coke
could no longer use "tying provisions" that required a buyer to
purchase a less popular Coke product with Coke's best-selling
products.142 In addition, Coke could no longer give rebates for
customers that agreed to reserve shelf space for Coke's entire
group of products.143 Lastly, Coke could no longer restrict the use
of rent-free beverage coolers; retailers are now free to use at least
20% of coolers' capacity for any product of their choosing. 144
3. Foreign Conduct That Affects U.S. Commerce
Since the Second Circuit's ruling in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America,4 5 courts and Congress have
recognized that foreign conduct that affects U.S. commerce can
be a violation of U.S. antitrust law. 146 A recent decision, Federal
Trade Commission v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc.,147 confirms this
proposition. The FTC is investigating Church & Dwight
("C&D"), maker of Trojan brand condoms, for possible antitrust
violations associated with C&D's category management

activities.148
The court held that evidence from C&D's Canadian
subsidiary was relevant in the FTC's investigation into C&D's
American operations.149 The FTC contended that the Canadian
documents were relevant because they could help explain the
difference in C&D's market share in the United States and
n' Id. at 6.
140
141
142

143
144

Id.

Id. at 5.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Recent Case Highlights Issues In Public Antitrust Investigations,
ANTITRUST TODAY (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.antitrusttoday.com/2010/
11/22/recent-case-highlights-issues-in-public-antitrust-investigations/.
147 Misc. No. 10-149, 2010 WL 4283998 (D. D.C. Oct. 29, 2010).
8Id. at *1.
149 Id. at *2.
145

146
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Canada. 150 C&D has a much lower market share in Canada, and
the FTC argued that this may be due to C&D's potentially illegal
sales tactics in the United States151 Siding with the FTC, the court
applied a very liberal relevance standard that was satisfied
because the information was reasonably relevant and because the
FTC's relevance arguments were not "obviously wrong. "152
The court also held that C&D was required to show that
compliance would "threaten[] to unduly disrupt or seriously
hinder" C&D's business operations."s' C&D failed to establish any
affidavits or other supporting proof that this would be unduly
burdensome, and the court granted the FTC's discovery requests
for the Canadian subsidiary.154
This decision indicates that in today's globalized economy,
a federal agency may investigate a foreign subsidiary of an
American company "merely because the agency's original grant
of authority is the investigation of economic activity that has had
an impact on interstate commerce within the United States." 5 5
For companies with U.S. and foreign offices, the court's adoption
of the "not obviously wrong" standard in Church and Dwight
may indicate that it will be very difficult for a company to object
to an investigation based on relevancy grounds.s 6 Assuming it
has the appropriate evidence, a company may be more successful
shielding foreign documents with legitimate burden objections
than relevance arguments.
III. Proposed Changes to U.S. Antitrust Law on Category

Management
The area of antitrust law as applied to category
management is still a relatively undefined area of law that leaves
practitioners with little guidance on what is permissible.
Although the FTC provided some general recommendations in its
2001 report, clearer guidelines would lead to a more efficient
practice of category management. In 2002, the FTC announced it
would not issue guidelines on the payment of slotting allowances
and that it would research the matter further;' however, nearly
soId. at *4.
Id.
Id.
sI Id. (quoting FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir.1977)).

151
152

154

Id.

155

Id. at *2.

156

ANTITRUST TODAY,

1'

supra-note 146.
ABA Handbook, supra note 2, at 30, n. 6.
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nine years later, the FTC has yet to fully address this issue.
Practitioners are left with vague FTC recommendations
such as, "the category captain [should] not bias its advice to the
retailer in such a way that it effectively excludes or significantly
disadvantages its competitors."s58 As the court stated in National
Petroleum, "rules, as contrasted with the holdings reached by
case-by-case adjudication, are more specific as to their scope, and
industry compliance is more likely simply because each company
is on clearer notice whether or not specific rules apply to it.""'
As the practice of category management continually grows'
and evolves, the law must do the same. A starting point would be
for the FTC to take notice of changes in European law and
follow suit. For example, the EC's Guidelines set forth concrete
standards with suggested lengths of category management
contracts 6 0 and specific market share thresholds.16 ' These
definitive standards, along with a list of five or six other specific
factors,162 provide firms in the EU with concrete guidance on
what will be considered anti-competitive.
U.S. antitrust law should also promulgate guidelines with
specific factors on which category management practices
constitute anti-competitive conduct. Category captain agreements
are more likely to be anti-competitive when large suppliers can
control distribution for a significant period of time.' 6 This being
the case, the FTC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") should
set specific market share limitations and term limits on category
management contracts. Several courts have established safe
harbors for short-term agreements that are terminable on short
notice;16 4 however, a definitive rule should be established to
provide sufficient notice for category captains. Also, one
commentator notes that courts generally attach liability when

FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 690-91 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
160 EC Guidelines, supra note 109, at
133.
161 Id. at
135.
162 See id. at
1132-40.
163 Wright, Antitrust Law, supra note 100, at 191.
164 See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Industries, 49 F.2d 380, 395 (7th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a presumption of lawfulness exists for exclusive
dealing contracts terminable in less than 1 year); see also Omega Envtl., Inc. v.
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the "short
duration and easy terminability of these agreements negates substantially their
potential to foreclose competition").
"1
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market foreclosure reaches 40%.16s This number, or a similar
amount, should be formalized in a specific guideline that
establishes how much market foreclosure constitutes an antitrust
violation.
Furthermore, the FTC and DOJ should take measures
aimed at mitigating the risk of collusive or exclusive category
captain practices. First, instead of merely suggesting that a
captain establish internal firewalls, the FTC and DOJ should
mandate that a company take specific measures to prevent the
inappropriate sharing of confidential information. Next,. the FTC
and DOJ should require captains and retailers to document their
arrangement so that it sets forth specific limitations on the extent
of the relationship. Category captains should then be required to
file these agreements with the FTC so it can monitor category
management relationships more effectively. As former FTC
Commissioner Leary pointed out in a 2005 interview, the FTC
really does not know which firms are acting as category captains,
which retailers they are working with, what functions these
captains are performing, and how much coordination is actually
involved.166 The FTC and DOJ need to collect this information
to answer these questions and get a better understanding of how
to address reform in this area. The FTC and DOJ could also use
this information to determine whether a captain is serving for
multiple retailers in a given geography. If so, the FTC or DOJ
could monitor whether this results in a "hub-and-spoke"
arrangement or whether it has the "common price setter" effect,
as discussed above.
IV. Why Category Management Is Beneficial to the Consumer
When performed in accordance with antitrust law,
category management is an effective retail marketing practice
that provides numerous benefits to consumers.'6 7 The practice
leads to the product selection and prices most favorable to
consumers and can be used to enhance a consumer's shopping
experience."'
Through category management, retailers are more likely to
carry the brands and products that consumers are most interested
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, "Foreclosure," and
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 318 (2002).
'66 FTC Interview, supra note 55, at 7.
167 Steiner, supra note 2, at
78.
6' See id.; see also Carameli, supra note 6, at 1314.
161
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in purchasing. 69 With information from their category captains,
retailers can enhance a consumer's shopping experience by
placing products in the most convenient location, using displays
in the most effective manner, and shelving complementary
products next to each other.o
Category management is evolving even further by
focusing not only on one category, but on multiple
complementary categories."' For example, Procter and Gamble
teamed up with Carrefour, Europe's leading retailer, to create the
"baby solution center," an example of a complementary category
management approach. 17 2 This "store within a store" brought
together complementary expertise from Nestl6, Johnson &
Johnson, Fisher-Price, and Procter & Gamble."' The "baby
solution center" incorporates all baby categories (diapers, wipes,
baby food/milk/formula, toys, baby cosmetics and baby clothes)
into one location to give the consumer an enhanced shopping
experience.1 74 Not only did this category management approach
provide consumers convenience, it also significantly increased
sales for the categories as a whole."s This is evidence that
collaboration among retailers and competing suppliers is
beneficial for all parties involved. It is also evidence that, given
the power to make category decisions, it is in a captain's best
interest to do what is best for the category as a whole, rather than
simply what is best for itself.
Category management not only enhances the consumer
shopping experience, it also increases retailer profits,"' ultimately
leading to lower prices."' The more efficient retailer-supplier
relationships created by category management yields higher
profits, thereby providing the most effective and profitable
product decisions."' For example, in a study comparing category
management to brand-by-brand management, retailers that used
the category management approach obtained a 10% profit
169 Carameli, supra note 6, at 1314.

See id.; see also Gruen, supra note 8, at 4.
"' See, e.g., Gruen, supra note 8, at 4.
17

172 Id.
173 Id.

Id.
Id. ("The results were impressive, with sales in the major categories
(diapers and food) increasing 34 to 51 per cent and sales in the impulse
categories (toys and clothing) doubling and tripling.").
174

1s

176

See ROUNDTABLE DIscUSSION supra note 10.

" Klein & Wright, supra note 10, at 437.
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improvement
over
retailers
using
brand-by-brand
management." In the same study, a simple cost-plus markup
approach, another popular marketing practice, led to a 60%
reduction in profit compared to a category management
approach.' The difference in performance was due to suboptimal pricing, more frequent ordering, and larger inventory
resulting from the cost-plus practice."' In another study,
European retailers using category management reported
impressive cost savings in multiple product categories. 8 2 These
results were achieved by reducing out-of-stocks, cutting SKUs,
and improving the efficiency of product delivery systems."'
Although there is some debate about whether increased
profits actually lead to consumer savings, 8 4 in such an intensely
competitive industry,"' it would be highly unlikely that a retailer
would not try to gain a competitive advantage through lower
prices. This is evidenced by the prevalence and success of the
discount-shopping strategy used by Wal-Mart and online
retailers. Also, studies indicate that retailer profits have not
increased during the period that category management strategies
have been in place, further suggesting that savings are actually
being passed on to consumers."'
Category captains are necessary tools in the use of
category management because retailers would be unable to create
these efficiencies on their own. "[T]he manufacturer may know
things like the times of year when a product will sell best, the
kinds of promotions that are most effective in moving the
product, or the kinds of complementary goods that might be
advantageously displayed in adjacent space.""' Retailers have
information about the category as a whole, but they need access
to suppliers' wealth of in-depth information to truly understand
consumer behavior.
"IJoseph M. Hall et al., Retailer Dynamic Pricing and Ordering
Decisions: Category Management Versus Brand-by-Brand Approaches, J.
RETAILING 172, 178 (2010).

18o Id.
181 Id.
'
Steiner, supra note 2, at 78, n. 13 (citation omitted).
m Id. (citation omitted).
184 See, e.g., Wright, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 102, at 311, n. 25; see
also Steiner, supra note 2, at 80.
1' See FOOD MKTG. INST., supra note 30 (showing that industry net profit
after taxes is only 1-2%).
186 Wright, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 102, at 311, n. 25.
I'l FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
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V. Conclusion
A fundamental concern of antitrust policy is whether a
potential anti-competitive activity actually benefits consumers",,
and, since category management does, courts should generally be
deferential to the practice. When performed in accordance with
proper antitrust law, category management is an effective retail
marketing practice that provides numerous benefits to the
consumer. For this reason, reform in this area should not be
aimed at prohibiting the practice, but rather at ensuring that the
practice is performed in the most legal and ethical manner.
Reform needs to establish clear guidance so that retailers and
suppliers know how to properly practice category management.
This will increase the use of category management and ultimately
benefit consumers through lower prices, better product offerings,
and enhanced shopping experiences. Consumers have a grave
interest in prohibiting anti-competitive conduct and preserving
this praciice, so retailers, suppliers, and lawmakers should do
everything possible to ensure this is accomplished.

188 Wright,

Antitrust Law, supra note 100, at 177.

